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different administrations. In regard to his statement of policies and measures he has, again, written quite successfully, though briefly. His history of parties is not so satisfactory. Much allowance should be made, of course, for the lack of sufficient space; but besides being brief, his account is rather superficial. This is, it seems to me, especially true and especially regrettable in the treatment of the Republican Party. The real character of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its influence in determining the creed of the Republican Party do not seem to me to be fully, or even correctly, set forth. When it comes to statements of general principles and scientific conclusions, the book is not of great value. In fact, it impresses me as being a little reckless. Taken as a whole, however, it is a welcome contribution to political literature.

J. W. BURGESS.

*The Philosophical Theory of the State.* By Bernard Bosanquet.  
London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1899. — xviii, 342 pp.

The Anglo-Saxon mind (to use a term whose current vogue is matched only by its vagueness) has never manifested much capacity for the more abstract forms of political speculation. British and American theorists have almost all, in the search for ultimate political truth, stopped short of the field in which Continental philosophers have exhibited their greatest feats of transcendental acrobatics and dialectic legerdemain. That German idealism might, however, be usefully blended with the more practical English thought, was appreciated by the late Professor T. H. Green, who embodied this conviction in his *Principles of Political Obligation*. Green's writings, unfortunately, are as German in style as they are in thought, and are desperately hard reading. Many of the best and most striking features of his theory have been put in attractive form by his pupils, especially Professor Ritchie; and Mr. Bosanquet presents the work before us as a restatement of Green's views on many points, supplemented and brought down to date by the suggestions of recent psychological and sociological discussion. The book is wholly philosophical in content: whatever may be the practical applications that may be made of it, they play no part here. The author is occupied solely with framing formulas through which the fundamental relations of political society may be logically explained.

The central thesis of the work is the absolute unity of the individual and the state: to set up such an antithesis as "the individual *versus* the state" is, it asserts, irrational. The end of man, the demonstra-

tion runs, is the realization of what is potential in him. To reach this end association with his kind — society — is indispensable; and the state is merely society controlling its members “through absolute physical power” (p. 185). But the question at once arises: If the state “controls” its members, is not an antithesis between the two implied? Not when the ultimate nature of both is understood. The essence of manhood is the free will; but the free will is manifested only in seeking the highest good of its subject, — namely, the fullest realization of his powers, — and this is attained only in the state. The state is the realization of the rational will; hence the individual is free — is truly himself — only when his will is identical with that of the state. Whatever coercion is employed by the state is, in fact, willed by the individual himself; for he wills his own good, and that good implies the state with all its power. Through the exercise of that power he is, in Rousseau’s famous words, “forced to be free” — forced to realize his highest good.

The demonstration of this main thesis requires little more than a commentary on certain familiar texts of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Bosanquet’s commentary is exceedingly well done, and embodies a real elucidation of some rather troublesome obscurities. The positive part is preceded by a destructive criticism of the so-called “individualistic” theories of Mill’s *Liberty*, of Bentham and of Spencer, who all solve the paradox of self-government by the limitation of the power of the state. The fallacy of these theories is found to be in the prejudice that authoritative interference is to be justified on the idea of “a boundary line between self and others rather than in the nature of what coercive authority is and is not able to do towards the promotion of good life” (p. 66). Mr. Bosanquet’s task is to obliterate this “boundary line” — so far, at least, as the political and ethical conceptions of liberty and authority are concerned. The clue to the process is found in Rousseau’s “general will,” which is admirably explained in Chapter V:

The habits and institutions of any community are, so to speak, the standing interpretation of all the private wills which compose it, and it is thus possible to assign to the General Will a concrete meaning as something different at once from every private will and from the vote of any given assembly, and yet as standing, on the whole, for what both the one and the other necessarily aim at sustaining as the framework of their life.

[Page 123.]

The most serious difficulty in this idea is that it involves the notion of unconscious will, and thus gives to the term “will” a sense

quite irreconcilable with that of ordinary usage. A similar difficulty occurs in the development of the conception of "liberty." Mr. Bosanquet concedes that the sense which he attaches to the term is more or less metaphorical. "We are passing from the idea of non-constraint pure and simple to the idea of more or less moulding and selection within the powers and activities of the self" (p. 137). But he makes out a good case for his contention that the more refined and subtle senses of both will and liberty are essential to the analysis of highly civilized life. "The claim of the dictionary-maker that the earliest or the average meaning is also the truest or the 'proper' meaning of words has no foundation" (p. 146). Mr. Bosanquet's chapter on "The Conception of Liberty" is perhaps the best in the work, and exhibits in the highest degree his ability to make philosophical abstractions readily intelligible.

The chapter on "The End and Limit of State Action" is less satisfactory. To harmonize with the general character of the author's thought, the state should be conceived as a highly abstract entity, and should be discussed only in terms of the most ultimate abstraction. But Mr. Bosanquet speaks in language that is perilously near to the concrete and practical.

By the State, then, we mean Society as a unit, recognized as rightly exercising control over its members through absolute physical power. [Page 184.]

If by "recognized" is meant "regarded," this is sufficiently abstract. But it is said immediately after:

The limits of the unit are, of course, determined by what looks like historical accident; but there is logic underneath the apparent accident, and the most tremendous political questions turn upon the delimitation of political units.

Here we are evidently dealing with the state as a definite geographical entity; and the "principle determining the area of states" is immediately formulated. Then follows a definition of the "State *de facto* (which is also *de jure*)"—a society "presenting itself *qua* a single independent corporation among other independent corporations." Mr. Bosanquet, in short, passes abruptly from one sense of "state" to another, and—most surprising of all—clearly injects a subjective element into his conception by the definition:

That Society, then, is a State, which is habitually recognized as a unit lawfully exercising force.

"Habitually recognized" is strongly suggestive of Bentham and Austin, and its use seems to indicate a momentary lapse on the part of the author from his normal Hegelianism.

The latter part of the book reveals no similar lapses. Mr. Bosanquet devotes one long chapter to a summary of Hegel's analysis of the state, as contained in the *Rechtsphilosophie*; and in the final chapter, "Institutions considered as Ethical Ideas," the spirit of the great German "*Gedankenspinner*" is manifest throughout. Witness this :

In institutions, then, we have that meeting point of the individual minds which is the social mind. But "meeting point" is an unhappy term, suggesting objects in space that touch at certain spots. Rather let us say, we have here the ideal substance, which as a universal structure is the social, but in its differentiated cases is the individual mind. And it is necessary to observe that the material of this fabric has determinate sources. Mind is not an empty point. It is the world as experienced. The institutions which as ethical ideas constitute mind are . . . attempts at unity, *etc.* [Pp. 298, 299.]

As institutions, in the sense thus indicated, the author discusses "the family," with property as a corollary, "the district or neighborhood," "the class" and "the nation-state." Here more than anywhere else in the book is discernible that air of intellectual inebriety which is bound to appear in the adepts of German idealism. Yet even here Mr. Bosanquet preserves a fair degree of equilibrium and puts into good light his claim that "the content of the self" is not to be found in the mere physical and mental oneness of an individual, but rather in the complex of influences which are expressed in the institutions that surround him.

WM. A. DUNNING.

*Outline of Practical Sociology, with Special Reference to American Conditions.* By CARROLL D. WRIGHT, LL.D., United States Commissioner of Labor. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1899. — xxv, 431 pp.

The deserved success of the English Citizen Series has led to the projection of a somewhat similar series for American citizens. Under the editorship of Professor A. B. Hart, of Harvard University, Longmans, Green & Co. are publishing a series of treatises on American government, finance, politics, economics, foreign policy, *etc.*, by such authorities as Professors Moore and Seligman, of Columbia; Dewey, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Morse,